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STRATEGIC TAX COMPETITION WITH A MOBILE POPULATION 
 
GONZALO EZEQUIEL FERNÁNDEZ 
 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo analiza un modelo estratégico de competición de impuestos donde el capital y 
los (idénticos) consumidores pueden migrar entre jurisdicciones. Los resultados obtenidos 
son comparados con los resultados del modelo tradicional de competencia tributaria, donde 
la población es inmóvil. Además de los efectos fiscales y pecuniarios que aparecen en el 
modelo tradicional, el modelo con población móvil presenta un nuevo efecto que 
distorsiona la provisión de bienes públicos. Como en el caso del efecto pecuniario, este 
nuevo efecto depende de si la jurisdicción es exportadora neta o importadora neta de 
capital. De esta manera en el caso de jurisdicciones simétricas ambos efectos desaparecen 
resultando en subprovisión de bienes públicos. En el caso donde las jurisdicciones son 
asimétricas, ambos modelos tienen los mismos resultados cualitativos, reforzando el 
modelo con población móvil los resultados de la externalidad pecuniaria.  
Clasificación JEL: H70, H73. 
Palabras clave: Competencia Tributaria, Población móvil  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile 
identical consumers. The results of the model are compared to the traditional strategic tax 
competition model with immobile population. In addition to the fiscal and pecuniary 
externalities present in the standard model, a new effect shows up in the mo-bility model to 
affect provision of the public good. As with the pecuniary externality, this new effect 
depends on whether the jurisdictions are net exporters or net importers of capital. Thus, in a 
symmetric set up, the mobility effect along with the pecuniary externality disappears, 
yielding unambiguous underprovision of the public good. While in the asymmetric case 
both models have the same qualitative results, the mobility model strengthens the effects of 
the pecuniary externality. The above results are obtained by comparing the form of the 
first-order conditions between the mobility and immobility cases. The remaining question 
is whether or not the equilibrium levels of the public goods conform to the predicted 
tendencies. This question is answered with an example. The results of this exercise show 
that when the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital, the level of the public good is lower 
in the mobility case than in the immobility case. However, if the jurisdiction is a net 
importer of capital, the public good level is sometimes higher and sometimes lower in the 
mobility case, contrary to predictions.  
JEL Classification: H70, H73. 
Keywords: Strategic Tax Competition, Mobile Population. 
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STRATEGIC TAX COMPETITION WITH A MOBILE POPULATION* 
 
GONZALO EZEQUIEL FERNÁNDEZ± 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Since the mid-80s, a huge public finance literature has focused on the fiscal 
interaction among governments due to tax-base mobility, which generates 
what is known as “tax competition”. In tax competition models, the analysis 
investigates the distortions that a tax on mobile capital causes in an economy 
where the tax revenue is used to finance public expenditure. The problem 
arises when one jurisdiction raises its capital-tax rate in order to increase the 
level of the public good. The net-of-tax return in that jurisdiction then falls 
below that prevailing in other jurisdictions, and capital relocates to other 
communities until net returns are equalized. This capital relocation is 
perceived as a cost by the community, which tends to reduce the level of 
provision of the public good. See Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), 
and Wildasin (2006) for surveys.  
The first studies analyzed models within a purely competitive setup. In this 
framework, there are a large number of competing communities, each 
providing, to a fixed immobile population, a local public good financed with a 
tax on capital employed locally. The total capital in the economy is fixed, but 
capital is mobile among jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are small relative to the 
economy, so that they do not affect the net-of-tax return to capital. Strategic 
interaction is then absent (tax rates of other communities are irrelevant), and 
each jurisdiction chooses its tax rate taking capital’s net return as parametric. 
This model is analyzed by Beck (1983), Wilson (1986), and Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986).  
A more recent literature has investigated models of tax competition when 
strategic interaction among communities is present. In this case, jurisdictions 
                                                          
* The model in this paper draws on suggestion of John D. Wilson. He is not 
responsible, of course, for any shortcomings in the analysis. 
± Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Calle 6 nº777, 
entre 47 y 48, 3er. piso, oficina 322 (1900). La Plata, Argentina. E-mail: 
gonzalo.fernandez@econo.unlp.edu.ar. 
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are large relative to the economy. Then each jurisdiction, by changing its 
capital-tax rate, is able to modify the net-of-tax return to capital (the capital 
outflow, due to a higher tax rate, is large enough to depress the net return). 
Therefore, to choose their optimal tax rates, jurisdictions take into account 
interjurisdictional capital flows and their effects on the net return to capital, 
viewing tax rates chosen by other jurisdictions as parametric. Wildasin (1988) 
and Bucovetsky (1991) are examples of this kind of model.  
In both kinds of models, equilibrium is inefficient, with the public good 
typically underprovided. This outcome is generated by the presence of two 
externalities. First, each jurisdiction ignores the positive externality it 
generates when it increases the capital tax rate (a higher tax rate causes capital 
to flow to other jurisdictions). The second externality appears when 
jurisdictions are large. In this case, the increase in the capital tax rate in a 
given jurisdiction depresses the earnings of all capital owners by lowering the 
net return to capital. When all jurisdictions are alike (symmetric case) this 
second externality vanishes. The reason is that each jurisdiction is then a zero 
exporter of capital. However, equilibrium tax rates are too low because each 
jurisdiction ignores the external gains from capital flows caused by an increase 
in its tax rate. Even though the capital stock ends up evenly divided among 
jurisdictions in the symmetric case, jurisdiction’s fears of tax base flight 
induce low tax rates. In equilibrium these fears are misplaced, and the 
resulting tax rates are too low.  
Most of these models consider the population of each jurisdiction as fixed. 
However, some recent articles include consumer mobility in their models. See 
Hoyt (1991a, 1993), Burbidge and Myers (1994), Henderson (1994), and 
Wilson (1997). These papers analyze the effect that different taxes have in 
models where land is present, and where local governments choose the fiscal 
variables. Bucovetsky (2011) studies the situation where households face a 
fixed uniform mobility cost when moving from one jurisdiction to another. 
Brueckner (2000) analyzes a perfectly competitive model where jurisdictions 
are formed by profit-maximizing community developers and heterogeneous 
consumers sort according to their preferences.  
The purpose of the present paper is to analyze a model of strategic tax 
competition with a mobile population, while attempting to maintain other 
features of the standard model. To do so, consumers are viewed as 
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homogeneous, in contrast to Brueckner (2000). In addition, land plays no role 
in the model, in contrast to the papers mentioned above.  
One departure from the standard setup, however, is the use of the 
community-developer model, which follows Brueckner (2000). The reason for 
using this model is that, when populations are mobile, it is not clear which is 
the right objective function for the community in a utility-maximizing 
framework. Is it the common utility level of the consumers, both within the 
community and outside? Is it the community population times the utility (i.e. 
“total utility” for community residents)? These issues disappear with the 
developer model since total profit is the unambiguous objective.  
In this framework, developers maximize profit by choosing capital-tax rates 
and public good levels. Consumers are identical and each owns  ̅ units of 
capital. They are free to choose where to reside and where to invest their 
capital (it could be in a different jurisdiction). So developers compete 
strategically for capital, and they have to ensure that each consumer in the 
community reaches at least the level of utility that prevails in other 
jurisdictions.  
The analysis of the equilibrium shows that, in addition to the two 
externalities explained above, there is a third effect that operates through 
population mobility. An explanation for this effect (in a context with two 
jurisdictions) is that when the tax rate in jurisdiction   increases, consumer 
income in jurisdiction   changes. The direction of this change depends on 
whether jurisdiction   is a net exporter or net importer of capital. In the first 
case, total income in jurisdiction   increases when the tax rate in jurisdiction   
increases. Then the level of public good in jurisdiction   must be increased to 
keep the utility level in jurisdiction   equal to the utility level in the other 
jurisdiction. This increase in the level of public good is another cost of raising 
the tax rate. However, if jurisdiction   is a net importer, income in 
jurisdiction   falls when the tax rate in   is raised, and the public good level in 
jurisdiction   can be reduced. Therefore, the developer in jurisdiction   enjoys 
an added benefit from increasing the tax rate.  
When jurisdictions are large enough and different (i.e. with different 
production functions), the results of the mobile population model differ from 
the results of the standard asymmetric tax competition model. The reason for 
this difference is the presence of the new mobility effect. If the community is a 
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net exporter of capital, the extra cost imposed by the mobility of the 
population tends to generate greater underprovision than in the fixed-
population setup.  
In the symmetric case (when jurisdictions have the same production 
functions) the outcome of the model is equivalent to that in the standard fixed-
population model. Since in equilibrium all jurisdictions are alike, each one is a 
zero of exporter of capital. Then the effect of the second externality explained 
above vanishes in both types of models. The new effect of free mobility also 
depends on the community being a net exporter or net importer of capital, so 
under symmetry it also is not present.  
Section 2 presents the model and compares the results with those of the 
fixed-population tax competition model. Section 3 explores a particular 
example for the asymmetric case, and section 4 generalizes the model to   
jurisdictions. Section 5 concludes.  
 
II. The Model and Analysis of the Equilibrium  
 
II.1. The Model  
 
The economy is divided in two jurisdictions governed by community 
developers. The developers behave strategically, taking account of the effect 
of their tax-rate choices on the net return to capital. Competitive firms in each 
jurisdiction produce a numeraire private good,   , with a constant-returns 
technology. The production function for the private good in jurisdiction   is 
         , where    gives the capital input in jurisdiction   and    is the labor 
input. Notice that since each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor, 
   is also the population in jurisdiction  . Expressed in intensive form, the 
production function is                , where   equals capital per worker in 
jurisdiction  .  
Community developers control provision of the public good, and they levy 
a tax per unit of capital to finance the provision of the good, with    denoting 
the tax rate in community  . Capital is freely mobile, so the net-of-tax return 
on capital,  , must be equal in both jurisdictions. That is, 
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                                        (1)  
 
  
                                    (2) 
 
Let   denote the wage in jurisdiction  . Then,  
 
              
                          (3)  
 
              
                          (4)  
 
The resource constraint is given by  
 
  
 ̅
   
  
 ̅
   
 ̅
 ̅
                        (5) 
 
where  ̅ is the fixed total amount of capital in the economy and  ̅ is total 
population in the economy. Letting      
 ̅
 denote the population share of 
jurisdiction 1, (5) can be written as  
 
             ̅                        (6) 
 
Equations (1)-(4) and (6) determine   ,   ,   ,    and   as functions of   , 
   and  . Then community developers, through their choice of taxes, influence 
the levels of these variables. In particular, the effects of changing    are1  
 
                                                          
1 The effects of changing    are analogous. 
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As indicated in the introduction, an increase in the tax rate in jurisdiction 1 
lowers capital’s net return  . Also, capital relocates, flowing from jurisdiction 
1 to jurisdiction 2. This flow of capital causes wages to fall in the jurisdiction 
where the tax rate is increased and to rise in the other jurisdiction.  
Turning to the remaining assumptions of the model, the private good can 
either be consumed directly as a private commodity,  , or used to produce a 
public good   at a constant cost of   per unit. Since   is a publicly provided 
private good, the cost of providing    units of the public good in jurisdiction   
is      . 
Consumers have identical preferences represented by a well-behaved utility 
function,         . Private good consumption is equal to the consumer’s wage 
income plus income from capital. Since it is assumed that ownership of the 
total stock of capital is equally shared among all individuals in the economy, 
utility can be written as                  ̅    . 
Developers collect taxes on capital, keeping any excess tax revenue as 
profits. So the objective function for jurisdiction   is             . The 
developer’s choice variables are    and   , the tax rate and public good level. In 
setting these variables, the developer takes into account the effects of his 
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decision on capital usage, on wages, and on the after-tax return to capital. 
However, in maximizing profits, developers treat population as parametric, 
even though the population ultimately adjusts among jurisdictions to satisfy 
the equilibrium conditions. Consistent with their parametric view of 
population sizes, developers attempt to offer the inhabitants of their 
community the same utility level as residents of other communities. In doing 
this, they rule out the possibility of jurisdictional utility differentials that 
would lead to relocation of the population. Thus, the optimization problem for 
the developer in jurisdiction 1 is 
 
   
        
        
        
   ̅            
 
subject to (1)-(4), (6), and the free mobility constraint  
 
       ̅                  
 
The developer of jurisdiction 2 faces a similar problem.  
 
Taking into account equations (1)-(4) and (6), which determine   ,   ,   , 
   and   as functions of   ,    and  , the first-order conditions for the 
developer are 
 
            ̅ (     
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   *  (     ̅    ) (
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)+      (12) 
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            ̅            ̅                        (14) 
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where   is the Lagrange multiplier for the “equal utility” constraint.  
From equations (12) and (13) the following condition is obtained:  
 
        ̅    
        ̅    
 
 
     
   
   
 
,   (    ̅) *  
 
     
        ̅    
        ̅    
+
  
   
-   (15) 
 
The interpretation of this condition is left until the next section.  
Finally a free entry condition is imposed. It is assumed that there are many 
potential developers that may enter to compete for a particular jurisdiction if 
profits are positive. Then, in equilibrium, both jurisdictions earn zero profits.2  
Thus,  
 
       ̅                             (16) 
 
Equations (14), (15), (16) and the analogous conditions for jurisdiction 2 
determine the values of   ,   ,   ,   , and  .3 
 
II. 2. Analysis of the Equilibrium  
 
In this section, the equilibrium conditions of the model are analyzed using 
as a benchmark the traditional strategic tax-competition model with fixed 
population. In that model, the government of each jurisdiction maximizes the 
utility of a representative individual taking into account the effects of its tax 
choice on ρ subject to a budget constraint.4 Thus, the optimization problem is  
                                                          
2 This can be seen clearly in model where developers bid for land to develop jurisdiction. In this 
case, the presence of positive profits would cause bids for land to increase until profits are 
reduced to zero. For simplicity, however, land is not included in the model. 
3 Notice that there are five unknowns and five equations since equation (14) is Repeated. 
4 See Wildasin (1988), Hoyt (1991b). 
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where    is determined from (1), (2), and (6), and where         ̅. The 
first order condition for this problem is 
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,   (    ̅)
  
   
-          (17) 
 
The comparison between models focuses on the provision of the public 
good. The relevant conditions that need to be compared are then equations (15) 
and (17).   
Equation (17) shows that the marginal benefit differs from the marginal 
cost of production of the public good ( ).5 This is due to the presence of two 
externalities. The first is known in the tax-competition literature as a fiscal 
externality. In (17), jurisdiction 1 ignores the benefit in jurisdiction 2 from the 
relocation of capital when its tax rate increases. This effect is captured by the 
denominator expression on the RHS of (17), which is less than unity, tending 
to make the RHS greater than  . With the MRS tending to be greater than  , 
the fiscal externality tends to make equilibrium tax rates too low.  
The second externality is known as a pecuniary externality.6 This 
externality shows up when the jurisdictions are big enough to influence the 
“terms-of-trade” by changing   when they change their tax rates. As explained 
above, the direction of this effect, which is captured by the second term in 
brackets in (17), depends on whether the jurisdiction is a net importer or net 
exporter of capital. When the jurisdiction is a net importer of capital (when 
    ̅), the community benefits from a lower value of  . The government 
                                                          
5 The marginal benefit is the sum of the resident’s marginal willingness to pay for one more unit 
of  , ∑             . Since   is a publicly provided private good, the marginal cost of 
producing   for   residents is    . The    then cancels out in (17). 
6 See DePater and Myers (1994). 
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then has an extra incentive to increase the tax rate, and as a result, 
overprovision of the public good may occur. This follows because the second 
term in (17) is negative when     ̅, tending to decrease the RHS expression 
below  . On the other hand, net-exporter jurisdictions are harmed by the lower 
value of   caused by a higher capital tax. This effect aggravates 
underprovision of the public good (in this case, the second term in (17) is 
positive, reinforcing the tendency of the RHS to exceed  ). 
These two externalities are also present in the mobility model. However, a 
third effect appears in equation (15), captured by the term involving the ratio 
of the   ’s. To see the origin of this term, note that when the tax rate is 
incremented in jurisdiction 1, consumer income in jurisdiction 2       ̅  
changes. Using (7) and (11), this change is given by  
 
 (      ̅)
   
 
 (    ̅)  
  
   
          
  {
                                         
                                        
  
 
If jurisdiction 1 is a net exporter of capital, then      ̅ increases when    
increases. Utility then rises in jurisdiction 2, and    must increase to maintain 
the utility equality. But this increase in    reduces the developer’s profit, 
lowering the benefit of raising   . So the mobility effect reinforces the effect of 
the pecuniary externality, strengthening the tendency of the net-exporter 
jurisdiction to keep the tax rate low, aggravating underprovision of the public 
good. However, if community 1 is a net importer, then      ̅ decreases with 
an increase of   , and    can be reduced. As noted above, in this case the 
pecuniary externality from raising    is beneficial, and the mobility effect adds 
another benefit. This strengthens the forces causing the net importer to raise its 
tax rate, increasing the tendency toward overprovision of the public good.  
In the symmetric case, where production functions in both jurisdictions are 
identical, jurisdictions do not export or import capital in equilibrium. 
Therefore, like the pecuniary externality, the mobility effect vanishes in this 
case. Since        ̅ holds in equilibrium, (15) reduces to  
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        ⁄  
   
   
 
          (18) 
 
However, inspection of (17) shows that this equation also reduces to (18) in 
the symmetric case. Therefore, provided that communities are symmetric, the 
strategic equilibrium is unaffected by the presence of population mobility. This 
is an important result because it shows that, in the symmetric case, the 
outcome of the model is equivalent to the main conclusions in the standard 
fixed-population model.7 Summarizing the preceding discussion yields 
Proposition 1 (i) In the symmetric case, where production functions are the 
same in both jurisdictions, the equilibrium in the mobile population model is 
the same as the equilibrium in the utility-maximizing model with fixed (and 
equal) populations.  
(ii) In the asymmetric case, when production functions are different across 
jurisdictions, the mobile population model predicts underprovision of the 
public good in the jurisdiction that is a net exporter of capital, but over or 
underprovision may occur in the net-importer jurisdiction. These results are 
the same as in the standard model.  
(iii) The form of the first-order conditions suggests that, in the mobility 
case, the tendency to underprovide the public good is strengthened for the net-
exporter jurisdiction, and that any tendency to overprovide the public good is 
strengthened for the net-importer jurisdiction.  
While the first and second parts of Proposition 1 show that the same 
qualitative results apply to the models with and without population mobility, 
the third part is a statement based on a comparison of the form of the first-
order conditions for the two types of models. However, as is well known from 
research in other areas of public economics, a comparison of the optimality 
                                                          
7 Wellish (2000) shows that, in the standard utility-maximizing tax competition symmetric 
model with mobile population, “each region completely internalizes the effects of its own 
actions on the welfare of nonresidents in order to conjecture migration responses, there are no 
external effects”. Then the provision of public goods is socially efficient, reaching a different 
result that the one obtained in the community-developer model. 
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rules across models does not necessarily translate into a straightforward 
comparison of the levels of the choice variables.8 
To see this issue in the present contest, suppose that the allocation of 
capital per worker happened to be the same in the mobility and immobility 
cases, yielding the same values of    and    for these cases, as well as the 
same values of    and   . Suppose further that      , so that community 1 
is the net exporter. Then, consider the question of whether the mobility 
equilibrium could have the same values of    and    as the immobility 
equilibrium. For this to be true, the values of    and    would have to be the 
same across equilibria, also implying a common value of  . Under these 
conditions, however, it is easily seen that the MRS expression in (15), which is 
equal to that in (17) given equality of arguments, is less than the RHS 
expression in (15). This conclusion follows because of the presence of the 
extra positive term on the RHS of (15) when community 1 is a net exporter. 
With the MRS less than the RHS expression in (15), the implication is that z1 
is too large, suggesting that its value must be reduced relative to the value in 
the immobility equilibrium to satisfy the optimality condition for the mobility 
case. Thus, the extent of underprovision in the net-exporting community 
should be larger in the mobility case. Reversing this argument for the case 
where community 1 is a net importer, it follows that the level of    should be 
larger in the mobility case for a net-importer community. If the public good is 
overprovided in that community, this worsens the extent of overprovision. If 
underprovision occurs, however, the conclusion is that underprovision is less 
severe.  
This discussion, however, is based on an assumption (identical capital 
stocks per worker in both equilibria) that typically will not be satisfied. As a 
result, the above predictions are only suggestive and may not actually hold. To 
investigate this issue further, the next section presents numerical examples 
comparing equilibria in the mobility and immobility cases.   
 
III. An Example  
 
                                                          
8 See Atkinson and Stern (1974). 
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To explore in more detail the differences between these two models in the 
asymmetric case (where production functions differ across jurisdictions), a 
particular example is presented. In the example, production functions are 
assumed to be quadratic, so that  
 
                                    (19)  
 
                                    (20)  
 
Then, the return to capital in each jurisdiction is given by  
 
                                 (21)  
 
                                (22)  
 
and the return to labor by  
 
      
                           (23) 
 
      
                           (24) 
  
The resource constraint is again  
 
             ̅                   (25)  
 
where   again is the share of the population in jurisdiction 1 and  ̅ is per 
capita capital in the economy. The consumer utility function is assumed to be 
linear, so that 
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                                    (26)  
 
This assumption, which is highly restrictive, is necessary to generate 
numerical solutions to the equilibrium conditions. Linearity yields a constant 
MRS equal to a on the LHS’s of both (15) and (17), while also generating a 
unitary value for the ratio of   ’s in (15). These simplifications facilitate a 
solution to the respective equilibrium systems, which remain highly nonlinear.  
From (21), (22), and (25)   ,   , and   are obtained as functions of   ,    
and  :  
 
   
  ̅                   
         
                (27) 
 
    
  ̅                   
         
                (28) 
 
       
     ̅                  ⁄  
         
            (29) 
 
Solving the developer’s optimization problem for this example, the 
equilibrium conditions (14), (15), and (16) (along with the analogous 
conditions for jurisdiction 2) reduce to  
 
                                  (30)  
 
  
 
     
   
   
 
*   (    ̅)
 
      
  
   
+              (31)  
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  ̅                                  (33)  
 
      ̅                               (34)  
 
Equations (23), (24), (27)-(34), constitute a system of ten equations and ten 
unknowns (  ,   ,  ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   , and  ) that can be solved for 
different values of the parameters of the model ( ,  ,  , ,  , and  ).  
The optimality conditions for the immobility model are given by (17) and 
the analogous conditions for the other jurisdiction. In this example, these 
conditions are 
  
  
 
     
   
   
 
*   (    ̅)
  
   
+                  (35)  
 
  
 
     
   
   
 
*   (    ̅)
  
   
+                      (36)  
 
Simultaneously solving equations (27)-(29), (35), and (36), the equilibrium 
values for   ,   ,   ,   , and   are obtained as functions of the parameters of 
the problem ( ,  ,  , ,  ,  , and  9). All the other variables (  ,   ,   ,   , 
  ,   ) are solved for by substitution.  
To compare the two models, the following exercise is carried out. First, the 
mobility model is solved for given values of the parameters. Among other 
values, the equilibrium population share θ is obtained. Then this equilibrium θ 
value is taken as a parameter in solving the immobility model. In this way, 
both models have the same population distribution.  
                                                          
9 In this model the population share is fixed. 
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Solutions are obtained using Mathematica for the following parameter 
values:    ,      ,    ,       . Note that     implies that 
jurisdiction 2 is the more productive. The parameter   is changed from 1.1 to 
1.5 to see what happens when the MRS is increased.  
It is important to explain why        is chosen. After running some 
simulations for several values of  , it was found that the results of the 
mobility model are very sensitive to the difference between   and  . 
Incrementing this difference (holding the value of   constant) by more than 
0.01128 leads to nonexistence of equilibrium.10  
The results are presented in Tables 1-6. In Table 1, the case where       
is shown. For the mobility model, the equilibrium values for  ,   ,   , and  , 
are 0.209155, 0.272817, 0.412331, and 1.62476, respectively. The level of 
capital per worker in jurisdiction 1 (  ) is 1.05121 and level of capital per 
worker in jurisdiction 2 (  ) is 0.986456. Public good levels are 0.286788 for 
community 1 and 0.406746 for community 2. Finally, equilibrium values for 
wages, level of private good, and utilities in both communities are shown in 
the last six rows. The third column displays the resulting values of the same 
variables for the immobility model, when       and   is fixed at 0.209155.  
The Tables show that, under the above parameters, jurisdiction 1 is the net 
importer of capital and jurisdiction 2 the net exporter. Then, as the theory 
predicts, the tax rate on capital in the net-importer jurisdiction is lower than in 
the net-exporter jurisdiction, and this is true for both models.  
Comparing the results for both models, it can be observed that for the net-
exporter jurisdiction, the level of public good is always (for any value of  ) 
smaller in the mobility case than in the immobility case. So the prediction of 
section 2.1 seems to hold. Then, looking at the net-importer jurisdiction, one 
would expect to find that the level of public good is always greater in the 
mobility model. However, this is not the case. For example, for values of 
     , the level of public good in the net-importer jurisdiction is lower in the 
mobility case. This outcome contradicts the prediction made above, and the 
reason is that, rather than being the same in both equilibria, the values of    
and    are different.  
                                                          
10 Calculations for          are available upon request. The results are not presented in the 
paper because they follow the same pattern as those for      . 
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Two additional observations can be made. First, notice that the capital level 
in the net-importer jurisdiction is always lower in the mobility case than in the 
immobility case. On the other hand, the capital level in the net-exporter 
jurisdiction is always higher under free mobility. This suggests that free 
population mobility smooths capital differences among jurisdictions.  
Finally, looking at the resulting utility levels for the immobility model, it 
can be seen that the small community inhabitants are always better off. This 
result was shown by Bucovetsky (1991), who demonstrated that when 
jurisdictions are different and use quadratic production functions, people in the 
small jurisdiction reach a higher level of utility than people in the big 
jurisdiction.  
 
IV. Generalization of the model  
 
Now consider a model with   jurisdictions. For each jurisdiction  , 
                   ,                    , and   are determined by the 
following      equations:  
 
                                                   (37) 
  
                                                    (38)  
                
∑     
 
     ̅                              (39)  
 
Differentiating equations (37) and (39) with respect to    yields  
 
   
   
 
∑       
          
  
      ∑       
       
 
   
                       (40) 
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Now the problem for a particular developer i is to  
 
   
       
         
       
    ̅            
s. t. (37)-(39), and 
       ̅            ̅     ,           
 
The first order conditions of this problem are:  
 
             ̅ (     
   
   
 ) 
  ∑   
 
   *  (     ̅    ) (
   
   
  ̅
  
   
)    (     ̅    )   (
   
   
  ̅
  
   
)+       (43) 
 
             ̅  ∑   
 
           ̅                        (44) 
 
  
            ̅            ̅         ,                      (45) 
 
where the    ’s are the     Lagrange multipliers for jurisdiction  .    
These     conditions plus the zero profit condition for jurisdiction   
(          ) determine the values of   ,   ,    and the     Lagrange 
multipliers as a function of taxes, public goods, and population shares of the 
other     jurisdictions. Since there are   jurisdictions facing the same 
maximization problem, we have       unknowns 
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(                          
      
      
        
      
       
      
        
 ) and 
      equations.11  
An equation analogous to (15) can be obtained for the general case from 
(43) and (44). This is  
 
  (     ̅   )
  (     ̅   )
  
=  
     
   
   
 
{   (    ̅)
  
   
 
 
∑   
 
   
[∑   
 
        ̅ 
  (     ̅   )
        ̅    
  
   
]}       (46) 
 
Now the extra term in the general model is more complicated than in the 2-
jurisdiction model because of the presence of the different  ’s. But in the 
symmetric case (where the production function is the same in all jurisdictions), 
    ̅ holds for all  , and the second and third terms in braces in (46) 
disappear, yielding (18) for        .12 This confirms the first part of 
Proposition 1 for the generalized case. However, the second and third parts of 
the proposition do not follow.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and 
mobile identical consumers is analyzed. The results of the model are compared 
to the traditional strategic tax competition model with immobile population.  
As is well known, the presence of two externalities (a fiscal externality and 
a pecuniary externality) affects provision of the public good in the standard 
                                                          
11 Notice that some restrictions are repeated, then some Lagrange multipliers are equal, e.g. 
     
 . So there are ( 
 
)  
  
        
 
      
 
 different restrictions, and the number of unknowns 
and equations is          
 
. 
12 Notice that, the fact that    
 
 
   holds in the symmetric case can be used along with (40) 
to yield    
    
 
   
     ̅ 
 
   
 
 
     ̅ 
  . Equation (46) then collapses to   
  
 
 
  ̅           
    ̅ 
 ̅. 
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model. In the mobility model, in addition to those externalities, a new effect 
shows up. As with the pecuniary externality, this new effect depends on 
whether the jurisdictions are net exporters or net importers of capital. Thus, in 
a symmetric set up, the mobility effect along with the pecuniary externality 
disappears, yielding unambiguous underprovision of the public good.  
While in the asymmetric case both models have the same qualitative results 
(underprovision of the public good if the jurisdiction is a net exporter of 
capital, and over or underprovision in the net-importer case), the mobility 
model strengthens the effects of the pecuniary externality. Then, if the 
jurisdiction is a net exporter (net importer) of capital, the tendency for 
underprovision (overprovision) is reinforced by the presence of population 
mobility.  
The above results are obtained by comparing the form of the first-order 
conditions between the mobility and immobility cases. The remaining question 
is whether or not the equilibrium levels of the public goods conform to the 
predicted tendencies. This question revisits the “rules vs. levels” issue seen 
elsewhere in public economics. The question is answered with an example 
using quadratic production functions and linear utility functions. The results of 
this exercise show that when the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital, the 
level of the public good is lower in the mobility case than in the immobility 
case (as Proposition 1 suggests). However, if the jurisdiction is a net importer 
of capital, the public good level is sometimes higher and sometimes lower in 
the mobility case, contrary to predictions.  
Finally, the model is generalized for   jurisdictions. As in the standard 
model, underprovision of the public good is the outcome of the mobility model 
in the symmetric case. But nothing can be said in the asymmetric case, since 
the form of the first-order conditions are more complicated than in the 2-
jurisdiction case.  
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Table 1.                   Table 2. 
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Table 3.                   Table 4.      
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Table 5.                   Table 6.  
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